We need to include the risk of our logistics tail to war gaming and campaign analysis per [the DSB Task Force on Energy reports] and should be doing everything we can to reduce the size of that tail (or at least make informed decisions relative to the capabilities of systems). Combine this with the likely closure of the Manas base and you have the reason why FBCF and the associated EEKPP are about capability, not merely "efficiency."Bingo. Weighting energy considerations appropriately in all aspects of DOD planning is not mainly about saving money (though it does), or limiting carbon emissions (though it will), or reducing US/DOD's dependence on foreign and finite oil (it does that too), it's first and foremost about tilting the odds in our favor ... and keeping the success and safety of our Soldiers, Marines and Airmen front and center.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Reader Response on DOD Fuel Tail Vulnerability
When I started this blog last summer I decided I wanted to limit it to one voice: mine. Some readers have discussed the merits (or lack thereof) of individual posts with me via email and that's been great. But we're at the point now where the frequency and quality of the back-channel comments has me considering turning comments on as an experiment. Here's one worth sharing on yesterday's post re: fuel and logistics issues, base closure in Kyrgzstan and our Afghanistan operations: