Hybrid Hopes for Greatly Reducing Operational Base Fuel Requirements

Sounds like a microgrid disguised as a generator.  See what you think:

Today, the U.S. military powers its operating bases with diesel generators that run continuously. The problem is that it’s difficult to match the generating capacity with the actual power load from air conditioners, electronics, and other gear, which fluctuates during the day and in different seasons. And when the demand for power is lower than the generator’s full capacity, the fuel efficiency drops off dramatically and the maintenance increases.

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Earl Energy’s FlexGen “hybrid generator” is wired to a diesel generator running at full capacity, which is how it's most efficient. When there is excess power, the diesel generator charges the batteries. If the batteries have enough stored energy to meet the demand for electricity, then the generator shuts off. In tests in Afghanistan, the Earl Energy system allowed the generators to run three to six hours a day, compared with around the clock before it was installed, says Doug Moorehead, the CEO of Earl Energy.

Often in stories like these there's a rub.  But if those real-world results from Afghanistan were achieved without any many compromises, then this is clearly a big win in an area we've made almost no progress for decades.  Will be keeping an eye on Moorehead and Earl Energy for sure.

Full IEEE Spectrum article: HERE.

US Commander in Afghanistan Says it Short and Sweet re: Operational Energy

Hat tip to Ollie for this. In a recent one-page memo on energy to all servicemen and servicewomen in theater, General Allen, USFOR-A, not the first and likely not the last Marine general to completely "get" energy, summed it up this way:

"Operational energy equates exactly to operational capability." 

Hard to miss his meaning. Supporting points included:

• "A military force that reduces its fuel consumption becomes more agile and insulates itself from logistics disruptions."
• "I expect commanders to improve fuel accountability ...."
• "[Operation energy] is about increasing our forces' endurance, becoming more lethal, and reducing the number of men and women risking their lives moving fuel."

You can read the memo HERE.

Image credit (and Gen Allen bio): Wikipedia

Preparing for the last battle: Lessons from Afghanistan

Interesting piece published in the NY Times about missed opportunities in U.S. efforts to improve Afghan infrastructure. This is not a strictly DOD energy story, but it should inform thinking about future operations and our own infrastructure challenges at home. The article, written by Patricia McArdle, reports on a number of efforts to bring energy security and other infrastructure projects to the Afghan people that went awry because we failed to understand the territory. In her 12 months as a political advisor with the Department of State, Ms. McArdle had a front row seat to observe the outcomes of many well intended plans. Standard operating procedures tell you what to do in a given set of circumstances. If that “given set of circumstances” do not exist, there is no SOP. We must reward innovation and not always compliance.

Despite a 2004 Department of Energy study of Afghanistan energy sources that “ revealed abundant renewable energy resources that could be used to build small-scale wind- and solar-powered systems to generate electricity and solar thermal devices for cooking and heating water”, the U.S. brought in diesel generators and created a critical vulnerability.

International building codes dictated that the U.S. build concrete and cinderblock buildings for local projects, resulting in buildings that were hot in summer and cold in winter. The Afghan locals build with “cob — a mixture of mud, sand, clay and chopped straw molded to form durable, elegant, super-insulated, earthquake-resistant structures. With their thick walls, small windows and natural ventilation, traditional Afghan homes may not comply with international building codes, but they are cooler in summer and warmer in winter than cinder-block buildings”. I first noticed this when, then Colonel T.C. Moore, USMC, head of the Marine Corps Energy Assessment Team (or as we liked to call him, the MEAT Head) pointed it out while we were visiting COB Payne in Southern Afghanistan. “You know, there’s a reason they build them that way” T.C. mused, “What don’t we get?”.

Even when DOD tried a renewable project in support of our Afghan partners, they looked through their own filters, not the locals. An example can be found in Dina Maron’s article about an Army Corps of Engineers' plan running into trouble with a wind project in Afghanistan. A plan to build a 1 MW wind turbine for the Afghan equivalent of my Rock Bound Highland Home (West Point) went poorly. Problem was that the guy who drew the blueprints hadn’t walked the road. The 300 ton crane necessary for this behemoth couldn’t navigate the terrain. A U.S. solution (huge, centralized power) is not necessarily the answer in less developed regions. Typically, in Afghan wind project one sees small, distributed generation and it is for a reason. A hundred 10KWs would have been more manageable in this terrain.

In the great book, “America’s First Battles, 1776-1965” edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, we learned that American’s tend to prepare for the first battle of the next war based upon how they fought the last battle of the previous war. This book changed American Military doctrine in a very positive way. We needed to be steeped in the past, not mired in it. After World War II, America helped rebuild Japan and Germany with 1950s technology. In Iraq and Afghanistan we have done the same thing: good, solid 1950s technology. Our model was big power plants and a larger grid, because that is what worked for America… and …Japan and …Germany. We must not prepare for the next battle with the tools of the last. Dan Nolan

Living with the Enemy: US Convoys through the Taliban's Eyes

Mid September Update: sorry folks, but while the link to this piece the CNAS site still works, the video it introduces has gone dead. Perhaps the video is live elsewhere, but we've all likely got bigger, more urgent fish to fry.

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The Center for New American Security (CNAS) featured THIS embedded Youtube video today, of an embedded Western journalist who wins the Taliban's trust and then films them as they go about their lives, including domestic scenes which humanize them, and battle scenes which show mountain ridge attacks on American convoys.

As this blog (and its featured JFQ articles) often discuss the heavy burden fuel convoys place on our war fighters, thought this might give readers a fuller (i.e., much less abstract) appreciation of the threat we're facing getting fuel delivered in Afghanistan.

Photo credit: The National Guard on Flickr.com

Conference Alert: Marines Ass Kicking on Energy Continues

The Jarheads are clearly on a roll re: examining and improving their operational energy posture. See recent DEB posts to this effect here and here.

Now there's more, and you heard it here first (or maybe second). You know the 4W+H format by now:

• What: Marine Corps Expeditionary Power and Energy Symposium
• When: January 25th-27th, 2010
• Where: Marriott New Orleans in New Orleans
• Who: Sponsored by NDIA, will feature a keynote address by a DOD energy rock star -- Marine Corps Commandant, General James T. Conway
• How: Go here for more info and to register

OK, here's a little more What: Marine Corps leaders and industry experts will explore challenges and opportunities to increase power and energy efficiency and self sufficiency in expeditionary warfare. This is a forum for the Marine Corps and private industry to discuss ideas and solutions to lessen the Corps’ power and energy dependencies and vulnerabilities as these issues pose an increasing threat to getting the mission done.

Photo of New Orleans at night from the Marriott: Credit to T. Hall on Flickr

Deloitte Weighs in on Current DOD Energy Situation

Ollie F, and now Karen A have made it plain: this Deloitte energy security report needs its 15 minutes of DOD Energy Blog fame and it needs it now.

I don't want to steal its thunder, but to help you better prioritize your time, here are some of its main focal points:

• Rising Energy Use in Warfare
• Global Oil Supply & Demand
• DOD Energy Consumption
• Potential Threats to Global Oil Infra
• Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) "in Blood and Money"
• Opportunities for Change: Fuel Optimization, Mobility Platform Fuel Optimization, Alternative Fuels & Power Generation

It's all good, and the FBCF part is particularly compelling. Recommend you give it a look.

Afghanistan Convoy Photo Credit: Deloitte

Marines MEAT their Afghanistan Energy Challenges Head On

Itinerant blogger and Sabot 6 founder Dan Nolan is back Afghanistan where he was on assignment for the Marines as an expert combat energy advisor. Here's his first write-up from this experience (caution -- I hope you don't find his style too dry):

In early September 2009 I arrived in Kandahar Afghanistan as part of the Marine Energy Assessment Team (MEAT). The team was led by a USMC fighter pilot/senior military advisor to the director of DARPA and composed of a combat wounded Warrant Officer fuels expert; a hard as woodpecker lips, Master Gunnery Sergeant utilities specialist, a Captain who gave the Commandant some advice in public; and a nerdy looking, renewable energy scientist with more steel in his spine than a Transformer.

The six of us arrived by C-17 after talking our way out of Kuwait (our papers were NOT in order) to determine ground truth regarding the USMC forward operating bases' (FOB's) use of energy. The Commandant had heard that the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) in theater was $400 per gallon and he wanted to know ground truth (e.g., if an F-16 refuels an F-16, it might be $400, otherwise closer to $15).

We visited large, mature, contractor-supported bases and tiny patrol bases where a Lieutenant and his platoon stood alone and unafraid against the darkness. From the nearly palatial “Board Walk” in Kandahar to the southernmost patrol base outside the aptly named FOB Payne, the magnificent men and women of the Corps execute their arduous mission with quiet professionalism that causes this old soldier’s heart to swell with pride.

The basic findings were that, at the large bases, energy was used effectively, but not efficiency and at the most forward location, bottled water was the largest component of the logistics burden. The important point is that the Corps is finding ways to measure consumption and what can be measured can be managed. They are serious about unleashing themselves from the tether of fuel and operational commanders are making this part of their mission. The Commandant has established his energy team, issued the marching orders and begun moving aggressively. I hope the other Services are watching and learning. The rest of the Department of the Navy is also stepping up. The SecNavy and CNO both spoke at the recent energy conference, laying out an aggressive, command-driven vision for the Navy in conservation, efficiency and renewable energy. Go Navy!

To which I add Go Army! and Go Air Force! This is great stuff the Marines are doing.

Seeking Lessons from the September 3rd Taliban Tanker Incident in Kunduz

The news cycle had come and gone on this report of Taliban-hijacked fuel tankers and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) attack on them which destroyed them, plus the hijackers, plus a large number of civilians gathered to get a share of the fuel provided by the oh-so-generous Taliban who "only have Afghan peoples' best interests in mind." Actually, it's still in the headlines as a NY Times reporter seeking to cover the aftermath was just taken hostage and rescued.

Of course, this incident is about energy, but it's also about so much more. I couldn't figure out how to tackle it until I received this missive from a friend in DOD who is tuned in to such matters:

Talk about a potpourri of issues ... vulnerable energy supply lines, likely third country nationals owning the original fuel trucks, close air support rules of engagement, host country populations needing energy, and now civilian casualties. 

Now ISAF is going to investigate how this all unfolded, with particular attention to the civilian casualties. Takes the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) to a whole new level, wouldn't you say?