DOEPP Deal Part 2: DOD Assessment of Services Energy Budget Budgets for Operational Energy

We wrote earlier about the long awaited report from the Assistant Secretary of the Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASDOEPP) certifying the Services budgets as regards Operational Energy. The timing of the release of this report is interesting. It was released on a Friday afternoon. For strategic communicators this is the prime time for issuing bad news. Have used the technique myself. The important thing is to then follow up with something to distract, such as the Operational Energy Strategy released the following Tuesday. Well played.

As previously, mentioned all Service budgets were certified against their own strategies. The following is a synopsis of the findings by Component. We split this post up into three section because of my attention span. Part 3 will be up tomorrow.

The Army’s budget was compared against their 2009 Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy. The ASDOEPP toyed with the idea of comparing it with the draft U.S. Army Power and Energy Strategy White Paper, dated April 1, 2010, but decided that it didn’t qualify as the Army’s stated strategy. Plus it in no way reflected what was contemplated in the FY2012 budget.

The Army has five energy security goals:

• ESG 1. Reduced Energy Consumption
• ESG 2. Increased Energy Efficiency Across Platforms and Facilities
• ESG 3. Increased Use of Renewable/Alternative Energy
• ESG 4. Assured Access to Sufficient Energy Supply
• ESG 5. Reduced Adverse Impacts on the Environment

Only 3 goals were seen as applicable to operational energy: ESGs 1, 2 & 3. The FY2012 Army budget was then examined to determine how well it supported the execution of these three goals. These were the assessment tools for this budget certification process.

For the most part, the Army was given credit for ongoing, long planned, acquisition programs begun well before their strategy was published and treated as supportive of the strategy. Programs such as the Advanced Mobile Medium Power Sources (AMMPS) that is to replace the current generation of Tactical Quiet Generators and the Hi Power program funded by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 2008, were examples of goal supporting programs. Also TARDEC’s Ground Vehicle Power and Mobility Integration program and the Rotorcraft Propulsion and Drives efforts received recognition for their support for ESG2. In fact, of the $212M identified as supportive of operational energy issues, 81% of the funding was in Science and Technology efforts.

Three other endeavors were noted as supportive of the Army’s stated energy security goals: foaming tents, the Tactical Fuel Managers Defense (TFMD) system and the Smart and Green Energy (SAGE) effort. The report goes on to note that the Army did not provide information on the tent foaming (ask Steve Anderson), SAGE will not be funded in 2012 and that no sustainment cost are programed in FY2012 for TFMD. Apparently, if you are not an acquisition based effort in the Army, you will have a glorious, but short life span.

The Army was rated as yellow in ESG 1&2 and green in ESG 3. No explanation of what the color code means was provided. Perhaps DOD should take a tip from DHS decision to drop color codes. It appears that they are grading on a pass/fail basis anyway and, in the case of the Army, energy leadership is defined as figuring out which way the crowd is going and getting in front of it. The Army should have been recognized for its Net Zero efforts on its power projection platforms (installations), but since there are no budget lines associated with it, there is no recognition. Their budget for FY2012 is certified.

Will post the Navy, Marine and Air Force certifications tomorrow. More to follow. Dan Nolan

Strangled in the Crib: Good Ideas in Operational Energy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy was recently at Harvard explaining what the military is doing to reduce energy use in theater. She told them about the egregious weight in batteries the troops are hauling on patrols, about 4 MPH vehicles and about the only program that has had a significant effect in cutting the use of energy for heating and cooling structures in the AOR. And then she told the audience that that one good idea had been abandoned because there was problem with the material (which is in use in millions of buildings in the U.S., interior and exterior), that there was a problem disposing of it (we landfill it in this country) and that the tents couldn’t be moved. The latter is a true statement, but the tents it was to be used on where not moving! Instead they were replaced every 2 or 3 years at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars a piece.

I am a bit exercise about this because I was part of the team that put the concept together at the Army's Rapid Equipping Force. We even wrote a user manual that contained the clearance from the Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) and the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). There is a memo dated 5 Aug 2010 from the ASA, Installations and Environment with amplifying instructions on safety decisions. The Air Force issued a memo in April 2010 recommending the use. Finally an Engineering and Construction bulletin was published in May 2010 by the Army Corps of Engineers further amplifying the use instructions for the material. I found out that the use of the foam had been suspended in Afghanistan last summer, but could get no official response when I asked why. I ensured that Ms. Burke’s office had all this information, but never received a response. I suppose it could have gone in someone’s junk mail file……….

BG (R) Steve Anderson knows this works. GEN Petraus’ logistician in Iraq, Anderson knows the true cost of fuel in blood and dollars and what this elegantly simple solution provides. He has been on the ground and seen the results. He has tried to tell the story, but no one is listening. John Spiller, formerly of the now defunct Power Surety Task Force (another good idea killed), can tell the story. He wrote the book on foam, literally. The foam haters out there are the Chihuahuas who have treed the bureaucrats who in turn have turned away from the one system that worked. Yes, the tents can’t be moved. Yes, extra precautions must be taken to provide for exits. Yes, it will burn, but it will not flash over to other tents! Right now we are building plywood buildings in Afghanistan. I have seen them being built. I didn’t see a lot of trees while I was there. Wonder what the fully burdened cost of plywood would be? And I have frozen my butt off in plywood buildings from Kosovo to Afghanistan; they are not known for their energy efficient properties.

The picture shows me, standing in front of a tent that was done improperly. It was not coated, it was not dug in and it was not properly vented. This is what has gotten contracting officers worked up. But it is a poor craftsman who blames his tools. Had the contractor been held accountable by the COTR this would not have happened. John Spiller could have trained them. Joe Amadee could have. I’ve got their numbers if anyone in the office of the Operational Energy would like to speak with them. With All Due Respect, Dan Nolan

Making the Numbers: From Energy Goals to Business Cases

The following is an attempt to translate the energy goals and mandates for the DoD in to units of energy in order to define the business case and opportunities that can bring the public and private sectors together in the name of energy security. It is a bit dense and I do not usually do math in public, but I believe it is worth the effort to get the conversation started.

At a time when America is recovering from an energy disaster on our shores, the DoD is taking bold, measurable steps toward energy conservation and efficiency as well as creating a portion of their energy needs from renewable sources. The Department of Defense is taking these audacious measures because they provide for energy security, reduce cost and improve the environment. Oh, and they have to, by law.

In the past five years, DoD, the Executive Branch and Congress have issued dozens of policies, Executive Orders, and mandates requiring the Department to reduce energy demand and produce more of their energy from renewable and alternative sources for the billions of square feet of installation real estate owned.

The Congressional Research Service’s Anthony Andrews published an excellent report (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40111.pdf) In February 2009 on the Departments policies and spending in regard to energy. In the report, there is a comprehensive review of “energy conservation legislation and Executive Orders that apply to the Department of Defense, directives and instructions to the military departments and agencies on implementing the legislation and orders, Defense spending on facility energy over the last decade, annual Defense appropriations that fund energy-conservation improvements, and Defense energy conservation investments.”.

For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) required “that the federal government offset its electric energy consumption with an increasing percentage of “renewable energy” from 3% starting in 2005 to not less than 7.5% by 2013 and each fiscal year thereafter.”. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requires “a 30% energy reduction in federal buildings by 2015 relative to a 2005 baseline.”. Executive Order 13423 amplified this stating that all federal agencies would reduce the production of greenhouse gases by a “reduction of energy intensity (3% annually through the end of FY2015, and 30% by the end of FY2015, relative to each agency’s baseline energy use in FY2003).”. So, 30% reduction in energy by 2015, relative to 2003 and production of 7.5% of that energy from renewables.

Here’s where it gets fun. In the same report it states that DoD consumption in FY2007 was 218,062 billion BTUs (BBTUs). It has steadily come down from FY2003 number of 242,240 BBTUs. Based on this report I have done a couple of back of the envelop calculations. By the way, I did not graduate in the bottom hundred in my class, but I knew all of those guys by their first names, so check the math.

Averaging the reductions since FY1999, we should anticipate a reduction of about 6,300 BBTUs annual. That reduction will achieve the 30% reduction required by 2015 in EO13423. That’s only 31,500 BBTUs to go. But the question is – and I think we all know the answer – have we already picked all the low hanging fruit? To compute the renewable energy required by 2013 in EPACT 2005 let’s use that 6,300 BBTUs reduction assumption. By 2013 the total energy requirement for DOD should be 179,193 BBTUs. In 2009 DoD reported that 2.9% of its energy was derived from renewable energy and/or renewable energy credits. Given that, by 2013 DoD will have to produce 7,512 BBTUs from renewable energy. That equates to 2,200 Gigawatt-hours of production. In the past DoD has used renewable energy credits to meet RE goals. With shrinking budgets, this may not be an option. Those same budgets will probably not be able to afford the 2.2 Terawatt-hours of capacity, much less the 31,500 BBTUs of energy conservation.

The only way to meet these requirements (not goals) is going to be through innovative third party financing. DoD will have to get serious about enhanced use leases, energy saving performance contracts, utilities energy services contracts and other innovative financing mechanisms . All of these vehicles are viable tools to achieve the statutory requirements and business is ready to go. This could have the effect of increasing energy security, simulating the economy, bring done the cost of RE, and protecting the environment all in one effort. Now that is a DoD size goal.

Time for a Leader: Who'll take the Reins in DOD Industry Energy Reform?

The 4Q09 edition of the journal Defense Concepts published by the journal of Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS) has a nice energy chicken-or-the-egg piece. Titled, "Defense Industry Energy Reform: Incentives and Capabilities," it examines the roles of DOD and the Aerospace & Defense industry as potential catalysts in bringing new approaches to energy to DOD and its warfighters.

Written and and researched by Benjamin Power and Steve Rotchtin, this paper does a good job of unpacking the business case (or mission case) for changing course on energy, both within the DOD and among its tech and services suppliers. Power and Rotchkin note that neither side is taking the lead so far:

The DOD has yet to institute comprehensively the type of structural changes that are necessary to address the military’s strategic energy vulnerability. Following the DOD’s lead, defense contractors have not yet made a clearly defined shift in the type of equipment that they produce. There are some indications of interest in energy efficient military technology from industry leaders like General Electric and Lockheed Martin, but these companies have been reluctant to invest heavily in this technology without a demonstrable accompanying shift in preference at the DOD. With legal constraints restraining sales of technology to certain customers, private industry’s development and investment in this field has mirrored that of the DOD.

Clearly, it's the military's role to specify what it needs to industry, not the other way around, though industry, by showing what's possible, might get DOD thinking differently about what's possible.

Written before the nomination of Sharon Burke for the DOD Director of Operational Energy, perhaps we'll see DOD move out more assertively in the near future. Though the case can be made for not holding your breath ... who knows if and when she'll get the actual nod from this very distracted Congress.

Click here for this issue of Defense Concepts. Energy article begins on page 33.

Photo Credit: Mary Clark on Flickr