Army Takes a Very Close Look at Convoy Casualties

All I can say is if you care about our troops, their ability to accomplish the missions they're given, and have been paying any attention to DOD energy issues, then this report is well worth your attention. Released in September 2009, it's called "Sustain the Mission Project: Casualty Factors for Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys Final Technical Report" and can be downloaded in PDF here.

Before you dive in deep, here are a couple of preview snippets. From the Conclusions section:

Since 2004, resupply casualties have been decreasing in Iraq and increasing in Afghanistan. Energy and water technologies are emerging that can substantively reduce the need for resupply convoys in theater; and therefore potentially reduce casualties without sacrificing operational effectiveness .... Resupplying troops in theater with fuel and water is a mission in which personnel vulnerability can be reduced through increased use of energy efficiency, renewable energy and on-site water production in theaters of operations.

and this on unforeseen consequences from Recommendations on MRAP vehicles:

The case of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle—the MRAP is a heavier, more formidable system, but fuel inefficient requiring more fuel convoys — is a good example of the issue of tradeoff between vulnerability and fuel efficiency. High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), which are particularly susceptible to improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, have been replaced by MRAPs in many cases. In the short term this is an excellent force protection solution to the IED problem; however, the MRAP consumes significantly more fuel than the traditional (and up-armored) HMMWV and therefore requires more fuel resupply convoys. The complexity and scope of these types of issues and tradeoffs is beyond the scope of the methodology and capability presented in this report. These hardware decisions require the application of large scale combat and combat support models used by the Army’s analytical agencies such as the Center for Army Analysis.

Take away: DOD requirements folks haven't had analytical tools for energy factors. Commanders' calls for better protection for troops in convoys simultaneously put more troops in harm's way as more convoys must travel IED-strewn roads to transport the additional fuel MRAPs' need vs. the trucks they replace. This report (and this blog's constant emphasis on metrics for operational energy) is a call to action for more and better energy-related analytical tools and models to improve mission effectiveness ... and save more of our brave, young folks' lives.

Photo Credit:  www.almc.army.mil

Reader Response on DOD Fuel Tail Vulnerability

When I started this blog last summer I decided I wanted to limit it to one voice: mine. Some readers have discussed the merits (or lack thereof) of individual posts with me via email and that's been great. But we're at the point now where the frequency and quality of the back-channel comments has me considering turning comments on as an experiment. Here's one worth sharing on yesterday's post re: fuel and logistics issues, base closure in Kyrgzstan and our Afghanistan operations:

We need to include the risk of our logistics tail to war gaming and campaign analysis per [the DSB Task Force on Energy reports] and should be doing everything we can to reduce the size of that tail (or at least make informed decisions relative to the capabilities of systems). Combine this with the likely closure of the Manas base and you have the reason why FBCF and the associated EEKPP are about capability, not merely "efficiency."

Bingo. Weighting energy considerations appropriately in all aspects of DOD planning is not mainly about saving money (though it does), or limiting carbon emissions (though it will), or reducing US/DOD's dependence on foreign and finite oil (it does that too), it's first and foremost about tilting the odds in our favor ... and keeping the success and safety of our Soldiers, Marines and Airmen front and center.

Air Force Energy Base Hit but No Home Run

I don't want to sound like I'm impossible to please, but ...

CJCSI 3170.01 tells DOD to "Use Energy KPP in all system acquisitions" and DoDI 5000.02 says "The fully burdened cost of delivered energy shall be used in trade-off analyses conducted for all DoD tactical systems with end items that create a demand for energy." 

Why then, does the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel appear once and only once in the 33 pages of the new Air Force Energy Program Policy memo dated 19 December 2008, and merely as an objective to create a "pilot acquisition strategy" for an acquisition and technology working group?

I'm not trying to be a jerk, and I haven't read every word, but the memo seems to devote a lot more language to establishing an "energy day" than it does to making the FBCF a part of the AF's core acquisition processes anytime soon.  And there's not one mention of the energy efficiency KPP.

It's good to see plenty on culture change and alt fuels development and certification. But still, how can the the AF ignore such plainly worded guidance on energy analytics and metrics from the top? What about a little "Unity of Purpose" as the DOD attempts to bring sweeping improvements in energy policy to all of its constituents?